warren · j. · dew

With the focus of U.S. military efforts in the middle east shifting from a tentative success in Iraq to an uncertain outcome in Afghanistan, it may be worthwhile to compare the two situations.

In Iraq, the U.S. had a long term plan of establishing a government that would represent all Iraqis. In Afghanistan, the goal appears to be retribution against a single person, with the U.S. commitment to the welfare of the populace far from clear.

Iraq's primary export was expected to be oil, which we're happy to buy. Afghanistan's biggest export is opium, comprising a third of the country's economy, an export that the U.S. government wishes to shut down.

"We do deserts, we don't do mountains." Deserts and flat terrain like Iraq are ideal for large, organized armies. Mountains favor insurgents.

Afghanistan may be shaping up to be more like Vietnam than like Iraq. Our key mistake in Vietnam was the commitment of ever increasing numbers of ground troops. Repeating that mistake may not be the best idea.

Much of the U.S. press seems to be painting the protests in Iran as a genuine, popular uprising against an autocratic, religiously fundamentalist regime.

It's true that the Iranian government is autocratic and religiously fundamentalist. However, it's also true that that government has the support of a large majority of its people, who mostly live in the rural countryside and small towns, and who are, by and large, religiously fundamentalist. While there may have been some voting fraud in some districts, it should come as no surprise that the vast majority of the population supported their current President.

The protesters are largely urban: college students and young urban professionals. While such populations might be typical in the U.S., they are not typical of Iran as a whole; they constitute a small minority of the population there. They're sufficiently atypical of Iran that they're not even well represented by "their" candidate, Mousavi, who is more typical of the Iranian governmental establishment.

The truth is, the protests in Iran are largely the protests of a minority that is being oppressed by a government supported by a large majority of the people there. They are in no way a popular uprising, and absent an externally planned and funded coup, have no chance of significantly affecting the government.

A few days ago, a U.N. aid convoy in Gaza reported being shelled by the Israeli Defense Force, despite staying in contact with the IDF and keeping them informed of its location. More recently, the IDF shelled the U.N. relief headquarters in Gaza, for which the Israeli defense minister has apologized, calling it a "grave mistake".

In the wake of these attacks, the U.N. temporarily suspended relief efforts in Gaza. That worked to put more pressure on Hamas to accept a cease fire on terms favorable to the Israelis. Conspiracy theorists might think assume that the actions were not as much of a mistake as Barak has said.

Generally, though, it makes sense not to blame malevolence where incompetence may be the cause. Lower level Israeli commanders might have thought the U.N. compound was a Hamas building, given the 700 refugees collected there. It's quite possible that the artillery unit involved in the earlier incident was just not communicating with the people talking to the U.N. convoy. It's even possible that some IDF soldiers don't know the difference between the high explosive shells normally used on buildings and the white phosphorus smoke shells said to have been used on the U.N. compound in violation of international law. Such things happen in every war.

Still, that's a mistake every few days - compared to, for example, U.S. forces in Iraq, who only made mistakes like that once every few years. Three decades ago, the IDF was one of the most vaunted and feared armies in the world. Have they lost their touch?

Links to articles:
http://www.reuters.com/article/newsMaps/idUSTRE50E2XK20090115
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1055830.html

The end of the Israel-Hamas cease fire and the subsequent fallout has led to a lot of discussion about what Israel can or should do, and why it's doing what it is. There's speculation about what the other Middle Eastern states' official and unofficial positions are, and about what Europe, the U.S., and the rest of the world should do and why.

What I haven't seen is any discussion about Hamas' point of view. They seem to be regarded only as a pawn or a random actor. Surely they have motivations?

I think understanding Hamas is simple. Their goal is the betterment of the Palestinian people in the face of an Israeli economic blockade. To achieve that goal, they have only two tools:

(1) rocket attacks on Israel that, while not being capable of doing real military damage, can exert some pressure and is a tool that can be used repeatedly;

(2) recognition of Israel, a tool which can be used only once.

Given that recognition of Israel can only be done once, doing it early would be foolish: it should only be done after Hamas has gained confidence that it will result in a permanent and satisfactory peace agreement. That leaves the rocket attacks.

Previous rocket attacks resulted in the recently expired six month cease fire. Hamas no doubt saw the cease fire as the first step towards a more permanent armistice. Hamas had an opportunity to demonstrate sufficient control to cut off the attacks when promised, which they largely did, as the first step towards future easing of the economic blockade.

Unfortunately for Hamas, Israel apparently saw the cease fire as just a way to procrastinate for six months, and all they offered was a renewal on the same terms. While living without adequate food, fuel, and medicine for six months might have been acceptable to Hamas, doing so forever is not.

Thus the present situation.

Why is Russia occupying the port of Poti, Georgia's major port, and not the Tbilisi international airport, Georgia's major airport? Holding both would isolate Georgia, allowing Russia to operate there with little scrutiny; neither is needed for peacekeeping in South Ossetia or Abkhazeti. A strategy that involves holding one and not the other, though, makes no obvious sense in a conflict between Russia and Georgia.

The answer, of course, is that the conflict was only between Russia and Georgia on 7 August. On that first day, they both sent substantial military forces into North Ossetia, beyond their respective "peacekeeping" contingents there. On that first day, the Russian forces charged from the Roki tunnel, and the Georgian forces attempted to cut them off before they could clear the mountain pass. On that first day, Russia lost five aircraft and about 100 men - about twice Georgia's losses. On that first day, Russia secured the pass and broke into the area beyond it, at which point all of Georgia was at the mercy of Russia's vastly superior military forces.

Since then, the game in Georgia has been between Russia and the U.S. The subsequent Russian moves have been obvious; the U.S. moves have been more subtle.

The first such move was a precipitous retreat of the Georgian forces. Retreats are difficult military maneuvers, and this one was no exception; it swelled the Georgian casualties to about twice the Russians', from half. Why would the Georgians retreat so precipitously when they were still inflicting significant casualties? It was because the move was politically necessary for the U.S., as further U.S. support would need to be contingent on any further bloodshed being clearly initiated by the Russians.

Russia advanced through South Ossetia and into Gori, in the geographic center of Georgia. This permitted them to cut the road between Georgia's capitol T'bilisi to the east and the coast and ports to the west.

The U.S. then airlifted Georgia's 2000 troop contingent in Iraq back to T'bilisi. This drew the strongest diplomatic objection that Russia has yet made regarding the war. Why? 2000 troops, even with experience in Iraq, are insignificant compared to the 70,000 Georgian troops already in Georgia. Yet Russia objected sharply and strenuously - strongly enough that it was clear the move was unexpected, and interfered with their plans.

The key was not the troops, but the aircraft transporting them. The aircraft, of course, were U.S. aircraft. They were landing at the T'bilisi airport. That meant that Russia could no longer attack that airport without attacking U.S. forces - and attacking U.S. forces would give the U.S. a reason to intervene in force. 2000 Georgian troops from Iraq would be insignificant, but the same could not be said for 20,000 U.S. Marines, backed up by the Navy and the Air Force.

In the meantime, Russian forces had taken advantage of the previous Georgian retreat to advance through the Kodori gorge in Abkhazeti and on into Poti, where they scuttled what there was of Georgia's navy.

The next U.S. move was the delivery of humanitarian aid - using U.S. Navy ships. Again, the importance was not so much in what was being delivered as in what was doing the deliveries.

Here the U.S. may have made a misstep, announcing this move in advance. The intent of that announcement was no doubt to show political resolve; however, it allowed the Russians to respond by tightening their control of Poti. That pressured the U.S. into sending the aid through Batumi, in Ajara, rather than through Poti as initially announced.

And that brings us up to date. Aside from the first day, none of the moves have involved actual bloodshed; it has been a quiet, but subtly positional, opening. What remains to be seen is how the rest of the game proceeds; will a draw be agreed to, or will one side play for a win?

I was going to write more about the war in Georgia, but I came across this excellent piece of background information about its origins first:

http://www.michaeltotten.com/archives/2008/08/the-truth-about-1.php

Normally I would heavily discount this account because it originates from an interview with a biased source. In this case, though, it explains a couple of odd things I'd come across independently while surfing news about this conflict:

1. When international news sources first started covering the conflict on 7 August, I went to Wikipedia to find out more background. I found an article that had not yet been updated to cover the events of August 7. However, it mentioned fighting that happened from 1-6 August and, notably, a ceasefire on 6 August. That wasn't the odd thing, though; cease fires break down all the time. Rather, the odd thing was a later report from a major news source - I think it was BBC or Al Jazeera - who had interviewed both Russian and Georgian authorities about how the cease fire happened. That report said that the Ossetian representative never managed to make the meeting - the Russian authority said that the Ossetian representative got a flat tire and was delayed for six hours. The Georgians then "unilaterally" put the cease fire into effect. How does a cease fire go into effect "unilaterally"? This article explains how: evidently, you quit shooting, even if the other guys keep shooting. I guess it's not surprising that cease fire only lasted one day.

2. There was, on a Georgian news web site, a piece critiquing Saakashvili's operational tactics a day or two after the events of 7 August. That piece discussed the Georgian military strategy, not of going to Tskhinvali 'to restore constitutional order in South Ossetia' as was the official Georgian government line that all the major news sources have accepted, but of trying to cut the Russians off at the Roki tunnel. If they had the initiative and were invading, how could they possibly get the timing wrong? This article explains why: the Russians were already moving through the tunnel; it was a race.

I'll probably still write the entry I was intending to write, which is about events since 7 August. It's late, and it will have to wait, though. Besides, Totten's article will make excellent background information for it.

Wednesday, U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice called for "creative solutions" for dealing with the middle east.

Thursday, Hamas knocked down the fence between the Gaza and Egypt, temporarily ending the isolation of Gaza.

Well, that's pretty creative.

I know a lot of my friends are not old enough to remember the period of the Vietnam war first hand. Memories of the Vietnam war tend to be emotionally charged, resulting in limited discussion of the facts. With both advocates and detractors of the Iraq war drawing parallels with Vietnam, I wanted to post about some of the actual historical context of the war - but there's so much, I don't know where to start.

Fortunately, someone has already posted much of what I wanted to write about:

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB118792232818807567.html?mod=googlenews_wsj

The author of the article points out that Bush's reminders of the tragedy in the aftermath of Vietnam - prison camps, boat people, killing fields - while not inaccurate, are incomplete. He goes on to point out other lessons that could be learned:

- Dumping allied leaders for reasons of convenience, as the U.S. did with Ngo Dinh Diem, can result in even worse leadership.

- Strategies that are successful militarily, such as with Abrams' change in focus to population protection, can still fail due to lack of political support.

- Successful counterinsurgency requires the ability to strike at insurgent sanctuaries, even across borders.

- Tragedies such as Bush does mention are exacerbated if no provision is made for refugees.

I don't necessarily agree with all his points - for example, I worry that promises to accept refugees may encourage locals to give up rather than solve their own problems - but I do think all these factors are worth remembering.

I would point out a couple of additional factors about the greater historical context of Vietnam that may make it an inexact parallel. Both are related to the fact that Vietnam happened in the context of the Cold War, where the United States had a clearly defined global opponent in the Soviet Union - something that is no longer the case.

The first thing I'd point out is that Vietnam was but one of the "hot" flare ups that occurred during the Cold War. Other examples might include the Korean War in the early 1950s and the Warsaw Pact's invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. There's nothing that says Vietnam is necessarily the best parallel.

The second is that U.S. policy goals are very different in Iraq from what they were in Vietnam. In Vietnam, the primary U.S. goal was never to help the Vietnamese themselves; rather, that goal was secondary to protecting the U.S. sphere of influence, in and beyond Vietnam, from encroachment by the Soviets. In Iraq, the primary goal - at least as Bush seems to see it - is to help the Iraqis themselves establish a freer nation to live in.

Those who fail to learn from history are doomed to repeat it. To learn from it, we must be able to discuss it.

Today, the congress of Venezuela granted their president the power to rule by decree, essentially making him dictator for 18 months - and likely until he is replaced by force.

Such actions are not unprecedented, of course. Perhaps the most famous case of a democracy voluntarily turning itself into a dictatorship is the German Enabling Act of 23 March 1933. While it technically granted powers to the cabinet, in practice it granted dictatorial powers to the Chancellor.

Many feel that the strength and long term stability of the United States' government is rooted in its being a democracy. I disagree. Democracies have been repeatedly shown to be highly vulnerable to charismatic and unscrupulous politicians.

Rather, the strength of the United States' government is rooted in its being a constitutional government, with a constitution that is difficult, though not impossible, to amend. The balance achieved by the U.S. constitution's amendment process, not democracy, is what has permitted the nation's government to remain largely stable for over two centuries.

With the U.N. security council turning its attention back to Iran, and with economic sanctions on the table, I thought I'd look at what Iran's economy was like to try to figure out whether this seemed likely to work.

As expected, Iran's major export is oil. Iran's biggest single import, though, was a surprising to me: it's gasoline. Hm ... why are these guys focusing on nuclear power, peaceful or otherwise, when what they need is refinery capacity for oil they already have?

Seems like the oil money is financing the pet projects of the mullahs and the political elite, while the majority of the population faces inflation, unemployment, and declining standards of living. It'll be interesting to see if the security council can come up with something that will actually put pressure on those in power, rather than just increasing the suffering of the general population.

Here's one of the more interesting of the articles I came across:

http://www.smh.com.au/news/world/the-changing-face-of-iran/2006/08/18/1155408022626.html?page=4

Now that the ceasefire in Lebanon seems to be holding, attention is turning to the question of who won. Victory is being claimed by both Israel and Hezbollah; naturally, the United States backs Israel's view, while Iran and Syria back Hezbollah's. But did either side actually win?

When Israel originally began its military operations a month ago, their stated objective was to recover the two soldiers captured by Hezbollah. The soldiers are still in Hezbollah's custody, no closer to return than ever. Judging by whether they have achieved their objectives, Israel can hardly be said to have won.

Two weeks ago, Hezbollah said they wouldn't stop fighting as long as there was even one Israeli soldier even one meter into Lebanon. At the time, Israel was only making small commando raids in the immediate vicinity of the border. Now, Israel has thousands of troops many miles into Lebanon. Judging by how well they met their goals, it looks like Hezbollah lost rather badly.

So was there a victor? I would suggest that the ceasefire does represent a victory of sorts: a victory for the diplomatic process. The U.N. Security Council were able to forge a ceasefire agreement that was ultimately ratified with no dissents by the cabinet of Israel, and also by the cabinet of Lebanon, in a unanimous vote that included representatives of Hezbollah.

It took a lot of work to get to an agreement that everyone could sign off on, and the story isn't over yet. It is, however, a hopeful sign that violence may not be the only way to get things done in the Middle East.

A week ago, Hezbollah was insisting that Israel not only return to the border, but also give up to Lebanon the Shaba farms area that Israel took from Syria in 1967, all before a cease fire could be discussed. Two days ago, they declared that cease fire was not to be considered as long as there were Israeli soldiers "even one meter" into Lebanon. They were even able to get the Lebanese government to adopt these hard line positions, preventing any real chance at negotiation.

Now, though, we're hearing a rather different story. Now, they want a cease fire without insisting on conditions. Now, "removing Israeli soldiers from Lebanon could be resolved through political discussions". Now they want both sides to stop the bombs and rockets. What changed?

Pretty clearly what changed was that Hezbollah did not feel threatened before, and now, after a broad based Israeli ground invasion, they do. Perhaps the Israelis are finally about to find and destroy their missile caches. Perhaps Hezbollah is worried they'll lose their popular support. The specific reason doesn't matter; what matters is that, in the face of adversity, Hezbollah crumbles. That makes a couple of things clear.

First, dealing with Hezbollah requires the willingness to use force. They're happy to rain missiles on towns as long as they aren't threatened, even if it results in hundreds of civilian Lebanese casualties, but if it's made clear that any violence on their part will result in a loss for their own organization, their activities can be limited to the political realm. That means that if an international force ends up occupying a buffer zone in south Lebanon, the force had better be able and willing to fight them.

Second, Hezbollah is not like the terrorist organizations which - whether or not one agrees with their methods - truly try to represent the interests of an oppressed group. That kind of organization doesn't knuckle under to force, because it's just strengthened by adversity. That kind of organization must be handled with different methods.

Traditionally, whenever Israel gets involved in any violence in the mideast, public positions tend to be very simplistic. Either all arabs are evil incarnate, or the U.S. and Israel are. Immediately after Hezbollah's initial attacks, the announcements ran true to form: Israel lumped Hezbollah and Hamas together despite their rather different circumstances and said they would hold Lebanon's government accountable for sheltering them.

Since then, though, there has been more care in differentiating various parties. In particular:

- people condemning Hezbollah don't automatically lump Hamas in with them. Even the Israeli government seems to be being somewhat careful about this.

- the Israeli government has switched its position on Lebanon's government, saying that their beef is just with Hezbollah.

- some Arab governments, while not approving of Israel, have condemned Hezbollah.

- many who condemn Israel's response in Lebanon still see the U.S. as potentially part of the solution.

It's not the specifics so much as that people are willing to think about some of the complexities of the situation that encourages me. Hopefully they'll continue to do so after the current crisis dies down.

For once, Israel is involved in a conflict where, if it's not clear that they are entirely in the right, it is at least clear that their opponents are in the wrong. Hezbollah's initial attack on and capture of Israeli soldiers had no visible provocation, and the possible motives, given the timing, seem to be selfish. The only possible beneficiaries seem to be Hasan Nasrallah, who improves his personal political standing among middle eastern Shiites, and Iran, which avoids U.N. Security Council sanctions by distracting the G8 meeting of heads of state in St. Petersburg.

That is not to say that Israel's behavior has been above reproach. Certainly shutting off sea and air access to all of Lebanon - forcing traffic to go by road through Syria, not an ally of Israel - seems unwise. Still, everyone seems to think that some response on the part of Israel was justified, and international criticism is unusually muted.

This leaves the Lebanese government in a difficult position. Without strong international pressure, Israel seems unlikely to cease bombing as long as Hezbollah continues to shoot rockets into Israeli territory. The Lebanese military is unable to control Hezbollah alone, and would certainly be no match for the Israelis, even if the Lebanese government were so inclined. The U.N. secretary general, Kofi Annan, is making noises about an international peacekeeping force, but the U.N. force already in Lebanon doesn't seem to have done much good. The situation doesn't leave the Lebanese government many choices.

There is one ray of hope, though. While Israel said, at the opening of hostilities, that they held the Lebanese government responsible for Hezbollah actions, they have now shifted to a more realistic view that Hezbollah is the enemy and not Lebanon as a whole. Israel doesn't particularly want to occupy the Hezbollah dominated areas of southern Lebanon - it didn't work out so well last time - so their ideal solution would be a Lebanese government strong enough and friendly enough to keep the peace in that area. That's a goal that the Lebanese government ought to embrace.

Lebanon's best approach would probably be to open direct negotiations with Israel. Not only would Israel prefer Lebanese government control to Hezbollah control in southern Lebanon, Israel may also be in a position to help make it happen. This solution would also avoid rewarding Hezbollah's violence, without disenfranchising the population of the area, as they would still be represented by the Lebanese government.

It won't be easy, but if it can be accomplished, it should leave everyone but Nasrallah better off.