warren · j. · dew

Much of the U.S. press seems to be painting the protests in Iran as a genuine, popular uprising against an autocratic, religiously fundamentalist regime.

It's true that the Iranian government is autocratic and religiously fundamentalist. However, it's also true that that government has the support of a large majority of its people, who mostly live in the rural countryside and small towns, and who are, by and large, religiously fundamentalist. While there may have been some voting fraud in some districts, it should come as no surprise that the vast majority of the population supported their current President.

The protesters are largely urban: college students and young urban professionals. While such populations might be typical in the U.S., they are not typical of Iran as a whole; they constitute a small minority of the population there. They're sufficiently atypical of Iran that they're not even well represented by "their" candidate, Mousavi, who is more typical of the Iranian governmental establishment.

The truth is, the protests in Iran are largely the protests of a minority that is being oppressed by a government supported by a large majority of the people there. They are in no way a popular uprising, and absent an externally planned and funded coup, have no chance of significantly affecting the government.

Why is Russia occupying the port of Poti, Georgia's major port, and not the Tbilisi international airport, Georgia's major airport? Holding both would isolate Georgia, allowing Russia to operate there with little scrutiny; neither is needed for peacekeeping in South Ossetia or Abkhazeti. A strategy that involves holding one and not the other, though, makes no obvious sense in a conflict between Russia and Georgia.

The answer, of course, is that the conflict was only between Russia and Georgia on 7 August. On that first day, they both sent substantial military forces into North Ossetia, beyond their respective "peacekeeping" contingents there. On that first day, the Russian forces charged from the Roki tunnel, and the Georgian forces attempted to cut them off before they could clear the mountain pass. On that first day, Russia lost five aircraft and about 100 men - about twice Georgia's losses. On that first day, Russia secured the pass and broke into the area beyond it, at which point all of Georgia was at the mercy of Russia's vastly superior military forces.

Since then, the game in Georgia has been between Russia and the U.S. The subsequent Russian moves have been obvious; the U.S. moves have been more subtle.

The first such move was a precipitous retreat of the Georgian forces. Retreats are difficult military maneuvers, and this one was no exception; it swelled the Georgian casualties to about twice the Russians', from half. Why would the Georgians retreat so precipitously when they were still inflicting significant casualties? It was because the move was politically necessary for the U.S., as further U.S. support would need to be contingent on any further bloodshed being clearly initiated by the Russians.

Russia advanced through South Ossetia and into Gori, in the geographic center of Georgia. This permitted them to cut the road between Georgia's capitol T'bilisi to the east and the coast and ports to the west.

The U.S. then airlifted Georgia's 2000 troop contingent in Iraq back to T'bilisi. This drew the strongest diplomatic objection that Russia has yet made regarding the war. Why? 2000 troops, even with experience in Iraq, are insignificant compared to the 70,000 Georgian troops already in Georgia. Yet Russia objected sharply and strenuously - strongly enough that it was clear the move was unexpected, and interfered with their plans.

The key was not the troops, but the aircraft transporting them. The aircraft, of course, were U.S. aircraft. They were landing at the T'bilisi airport. That meant that Russia could no longer attack that airport without attacking U.S. forces - and attacking U.S. forces would give the U.S. a reason to intervene in force. 2000 Georgian troops from Iraq would be insignificant, but the same could not be said for 20,000 U.S. Marines, backed up by the Navy and the Air Force.

In the meantime, Russian forces had taken advantage of the previous Georgian retreat to advance through the Kodori gorge in Abkhazeti and on into Poti, where they scuttled what there was of Georgia's navy.

The next U.S. move was the delivery of humanitarian aid - using U.S. Navy ships. Again, the importance was not so much in what was being delivered as in what was doing the deliveries.

Here the U.S. may have made a misstep, announcing this move in advance. The intent of that announcement was no doubt to show political resolve; however, it allowed the Russians to respond by tightening their control of Poti. That pressured the U.S. into sending the aid through Batumi, in Ajara, rather than through Poti as initially announced.

And that brings us up to date. Aside from the first day, none of the moves have involved actual bloodshed; it has been a quiet, but subtly positional, opening. What remains to be seen is how the rest of the game proceeds; will a draw be agreed to, or will one side play for a win?

I was going to write more about the war in Georgia, but I came across this excellent piece of background information about its origins first:

http://www.michaeltotten.com/archives/2008/08/the-truth-about-1.php

Normally I would heavily discount this account because it originates from an interview with a biased source. In this case, though, it explains a couple of odd things I'd come across independently while surfing news about this conflict:

1. When international news sources first started covering the conflict on 7 August, I went to Wikipedia to find out more background. I found an article that had not yet been updated to cover the events of August 7. However, it mentioned fighting that happened from 1-6 August and, notably, a ceasefire on 6 August. That wasn't the odd thing, though; cease fires break down all the time. Rather, the odd thing was a later report from a major news source - I think it was BBC or Al Jazeera - who had interviewed both Russian and Georgian authorities about how the cease fire happened. That report said that the Ossetian representative never managed to make the meeting - the Russian authority said that the Ossetian representative got a flat tire and was delayed for six hours. The Georgians then "unilaterally" put the cease fire into effect. How does a cease fire go into effect "unilaterally"? This article explains how: evidently, you quit shooting, even if the other guys keep shooting. I guess it's not surprising that cease fire only lasted one day.

2. There was, on a Georgian news web site, a piece critiquing Saakashvili's operational tactics a day or two after the events of 7 August. That piece discussed the Georgian military strategy, not of going to Tskhinvali 'to restore constitutional order in South Ossetia' as was the official Georgian government line that all the major news sources have accepted, but of trying to cut the Russians off at the Roki tunnel. If they had the initiative and were invading, how could they possibly get the timing wrong? This article explains why: the Russians were already moving through the tunnel; it was a race.

I'll probably still write the entry I was intending to write, which is about events since 7 August. It's late, and it will have to wait, though. Besides, Totten's article will make excellent background information for it.

Wednesday, U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice called for "creative solutions" for dealing with the middle east.

Thursday, Hamas knocked down the fence between the Gaza and Egypt, temporarily ending the isolation of Gaza.

Well, that's pretty creative.